The (Strong) Free Will Theorem (FWT) of Conway & Kochen (2009) on the one hand follows from uncontroversial parts of modern physics and elementary mathematical and logical reasoning, but on the other hand seems predicated on an undefined notion of free will (allowing physicists to ``freely choose'' the settings of their experiments). This makes the theorem philosophically vulnerable, especially if it is construed as a proof of indeterminism or even of libertarian free will(as Conway&Kochen suggest). ud ud However, Cator and the author (Foundations of Physics 44, 781-791, 2014) previously gave a reformulation of the FWT that does not presuppose indeterminism, but rather assumes a mathematically specific form of such ``free choices'' even in a deterministic world (based on a non-probabilistic independence assumption). In the present paper, which is a philosophical sequel to the one just mentioned, I argue that the concept of free will used in the latter version of the FWT is essentially the one proposed by Lewis (1981), also known as `local miracle compatibilism' (of which I give a mathematical interpretation that might beud of some independent interest also beyond its application to the FWT). As such, the (reformulated)FWT in my view challenges compatibilist free will a la Lewis (albeit in a contrived way via bipartite EPR-type experiments), falling short of supporting libertarian free will.
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机译:Conway&Kochen(2009)的(强)自由意志定理(FWT)源自现代物理学中无争议的部分以及基本的数学和逻辑推理,但另一方面似乎是基于未定义的自由意志概念(允许物理学家``自由选择''他们的实验设置)。这使得该定理在哲学上是脆弱的,特别是如果该定理被解释为是不确定性甚至自由主义者自由意志的证明(如康韦和科琴所建议)。 ud ud但是,Cator和作者(Foundations of Physics 44,781-791,2014)以前对FWT进行了重新表述,该表述并不以不确定性为前提,而是假设这种“自由选择”在数学上是特定形式的。即使在确定性世界中(基于非概率独立性假设)。在本文中,它是刚刚提到的哲学续集的哲学续集,我认为,在FWT的后一版本中使用的自由意志的概念本质上是Lewis(1981)提出的概念,也称为“局部奇迹相容性”。 ”(我给出了一种数学解释,除了将其应用于FWT之外,可能还具有一些独立的利益)。因此,在我看来,(重组的)FWT挑战自由主义者意志(尽管是通过二分EPR型实验以人为方式进行的)以自由主义者的意志,但未能支持自由主义者的自由意志。
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