Operational Art in the Korean War: A Comparison between General MacArthur and General Walker.

摘要

This monograph addresses operational art during a specific period of the Korean War. Both General Walton H. Walker and General Douglas MacArthur developed operational approaches to unify Korea when the decision was made to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea. General MacArthur's approach used two major ground commands and was more daring, but it also was more complicated. General Walker, on the other hand, proposed an approach that used one unified ground commander, seemed more methodical, and was less daring. Ultimately, General MacArthur's approach was the one that was executed. The X Corps amphibious assault did not bring the anticipated result. The outloading of X Corps in preparation for the assault took longer than anticipated, and the enemy had mined the sea approaches to Wonsan. These two factors combined with an unsynchronized ground attack by I ROK Corps eliminated the chance of a successful envelopment. The monograph provides insight into the relationship between the commander's personality, his previous operational experiences, and his preference for a particular type of operational approach.