Contemporary Leadership and Doctrine: The Utility of Analyzing the Outcome of Thucydides' The Peloponnesian War Via Clausewitz's Concepts as Articulated in On War.

摘要

Comprehending Thucydides The Peloponnesian War is a challenging task for students, and the same can be said for Clausewitz's On War. This analysis provides a practical basis for applying Clausewitz's concepts to an historical event, and provides a framework for gaining a better understanding of the Peloponnesian war as an aide to the study of Thucydides. Additionally, this analysis demonstrates the danger of developing modern doctrine without considering relevant history and demonstrates the importance of leadership in relation to doctrine. This paper addresses the following research question: can the concepts set forth by Clausewitz in On War provide a satisfactory explanation of the outcome of the Peloponnesian war. To answer that question, the concepts set forth by Clausewitz in On War are applied to both Sparta's victory and Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War. That application is framed by a focus on select aspects of military leadership.