China's Anti-Access/Area Denial Strategy and Implications for Special Operations Forces Air Mobility.

摘要

Special operations are a critical part of the US approach to war. A prerequisite for SOF operations is the ability to get forces to the objective and enable their freedom of action, known as operational access. Without sufficient operational access, SOF cannot successfully achieve the desired effects. Operational access for SOF is achievable in the land, sea, and air domains. In the Asia-Pacific theater, limited land access makes the air and sea domains more important. China's recent modernization challenges US access through the air and sea domain through an Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) strategy. This study compares China's A2/AD strategy, doctrine, and military modernization with US strategy and doctrine to determine the impact on US SOF air mobility's capacity to conduct operations in the Asia-Pacific theater. It concludes that China's A2/AD strategy has significantly reduced the operational access of US SOF air mobility to the point where Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) assets are no longer able to provide the access required. The current limitations of AFSOC's aircraft, the limited operational reach and basing options in the Asia-Pacific region, and the challenges associated with US doctrine and joint concepts in an A2/AD environment would likely prevent US SOF air mobility from accomplishing the missions required. To correct this deficiency, the US should look to acquire a low observable mobility aircraft, expand the number of operating bases in the Asia-Pacific theater, and develop a distributed C2 structure.