Assessment of Contractor Personnel Security Clearance Processes in the Four Defense Intelligence Agencies

摘要

Our objective was to assess: (a) how, or if, substantiated investigations of misconduct were reported to Agency Clearance Adjudication Facilities (CAF) and to the DoD Consolidated Adjudication Facility (DODCAF); (b) if the referred investigations had been adjudicated; and (c) the results of those security adjudications. What We Found: (1) There was a lack of effective personnel security policy. (2) There was a lack of effective record keeping. (3) There was an avoidance of personnel security adjudication for contractor personnel involved in misconduct. (4) There was a lack of personnel security information sharing. (5) There was a lack of connectivity between the Defense Central Index of Investigations (DCII) and the joint Personnel Adjudicative System (JPAS). We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence USD(I): develop overarching policies governing operation of DCII and JPAS; expedite publishing new security policy; and advocate revising EO 12968 to require that personnel security clearance adjudicative and due process actions continue, even if the contractor employee no longer has access to classified information. USD(I) concurred with these recommendations. We redirected revision of one directive to Office of General Counsel, DoD. We recommend that the Offices of Security of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Geospatial-lntelligence Agency (NGA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and National Security Agency (NSA), Offices of Security, develop formal procedures to ensure that reports of investigation into misconduct by contractor personnel are reported to the appropriate adjudicative organizations; and ensure that the appropriate security databases are populated with personnel security adjudicative determinations. The Agencies concurred with some of these recommendations and non-concurred with others.