Federal Environmental Remediation Contractual and Insurance-Based Risk Allocation Schemes: Are They Getting the Job Done.

摘要

Federal environmental remediation projects are laden with risks - risks that are often undetectable before remediation work begins. Recognizing they cannot specifically account for such unknown contingencies via contract, the Government and remediation contractors employ contractual and insurance- based methods to shift or reduce their respective risks. This thesis examines and critiques the effectiveness of such risk-shifting measures as they pertain to the Government, the remediation contractor, and, most importantly, getting the job done. To provide a foundation for understanding federal environmental remediation contracts and risk allocation therein, Chapter II begins with an overview of the circumstances that make federal environmental remediation contracts unique. Those circumstances include the variant conditions of cleanup sites; complexity of relevant environmental and federal procurement laws; heightened community interest in project successes and failures; and contracting parties' potential exposure to staggering unanticipated expenses. Chapter II concludes with an analysis of Government and contractor motivations for taking on such risky projects. This background is essential, because some, if not all, of these factors frequently impact the way federal environmental remediation contracts are structured.