Preemption, 'Red Lines', and International Law: The Legality of the 2002 National Security Strategy and a Nuclear North Korea

摘要

Since the mid-twentieth century, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has actively pursued a nuclear program aimed at developing nuclear weapons. In early 2005 the DPRK publicly announced it possessed such weapons. Since then multilateral talks have failed to produce a resolution to the threat or seriously address the potential a nuclear DPRK poses for proliferation of nuclear systems and materials. This project focuses on the strategic concept of preemption as outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS). and the implications of dealing with the DPRK. It provides a brief history of North Korea's nuclear program the ensuing negotiations and describes where the issue presently stands. Because preemption opens a veritable Pandora's box of legal moral and international implications the study explores international law and its views on preemption. It continues with an explanation of red lines and the advantages and pitfalls of setting them. It suggests possible avenues the current administration might explore that respects international law rallies support from allies and sends unequivocal signals to Pyongyang. The paper concludes with proposed changes to the NSS the rationale for the changes and the conditions which must be met to implement them.