Why the Iraqi Resistance to the Coalition Invasion Was so Weak

摘要

In Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), American forces were able to capture Baghdad and depose Saddam Hussein's regime within a period of less than three weeks, at the cost of relatively few U.S. killed and wounded. The British units that constituted the other part of the Coalition's invasion force captured Basra, Iraq's second-largest city, also with minimal casualties. Drawing upon information derived primarily from interviews with former senior Iraqi civilian and military officials, this monograph focuses on two questions relating to the rapidity and ease of that victory: (1) Why did the vast majority of Iraqi forces fail to offer significant or effective resistance; and (2) Why did the Iraqi leader fail to adopt certain defensive measures that would have made the Coalition invasion more difficult and costly. The analysis shows that the rapid collapse of Iraqi resistance was due to a combination of the following: (1) Saddam's strategic miscalculations and preoccupation with internal threats; (2) the flawed Iraqi strategy, poorly managed and executed battlefield operations, and inferior equipment; (3) the poor motivation and morale of the Iraqi Regular Army and Republican Guard forces; and (4) the superior firepower and other warfighting capabilities of U.S. forces. Any one of these shortcoming might have compromised an effective Iraqi defense; collectively, they ensured a monumental rout.