Deterrence and Engagement: U.S. and North Korean Interactions over Nuclear Weapons since the End of the Cold War

摘要

The North Korean nuclear crisis needs to be understood comprehensively, taking into account both international relations and the domestic political dynamics of the countries involved. This thesis analyzes North Korean and U.S. policies during two nuclear crises (1993-1994 and 2002- present) and proposes an option for reaching a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. The results show that North Korea has pursued nuclear weapons with a unique historical, cultural, and political strategy. It has pursued the development of nuclear weapons as both a security mechanism and as a diplomatic tool to overcome its economic difficulties. Recently, North Korea has shown a somewhat more predictable policy toward nuclear issues. In terms of U.S. responses to North Korea's nuclear program, the Clinton administration attempted to modify North Korea's bad behavior with engagement. By contrast, the Bush administration tried to change the Pyongyang regime by adopting a hard-line approach. Since North Korea's explosive test in October 2006, however, the United States has reestablished a positive engagement with North Korea. According to the author, the best option for achieving North Korean denuclearization is to apply multilateral and integrated threat reduction programs in North Korea in a comprehensive manner with responsibility shared by all parties to the Six-Party Talks.