Preparing for One War and Getting Another

摘要

Current trends in defense thinking show signs of being influenced by the notion that preparing for one form of war has brought about another. It is captured in the almost routine claim that America's superiority in conventional warfare is so great that it is driving our adversaries toward irregular methods. All of these examples share the basic assumption that we are now fighting (and will likely continue to fight) conflicts for which we have not prepared -- precisely because we have not prepared for them. Thus, the modern complement -- a preparation paradox -- to the old Latin adage 'If you want peace, prepare for war,' might well be 'If you want one kind of war, prepare for another.' Paradoxical propositions of this sort have a certain intellectual appeal: they are keen and pithy, and thus are frequently used in debates. Edward Luttwak's classic work, 'Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace,' attempted to argue that the realm of strategy is full of paradoxical propositions. However, embracing any paradox is rarely a good idea. This one rests on at least two questionable premises. The first of these is the assumption that America's broad range of foes or potential foes can be grouped together. They cannot. Second, the preparation paradox assumes that substantive change is easier for our foes than it is for us, but the evidence actually points in the opposite direction. While the U.S. military remains eloquent in the vernacular of battle, it is still developing fluency in the language of war. Embracing the preparation paradox would only harm this effort. As we have seen, the premises of the paradox are invalid; however, they have contributed to shaping many of the debates within defense circles today. For that reason, it is important to examine them, and to understand why they are faulty. The problem is that some propositions remain persuasive long after they have been stripped of any semblance of logic.