Government's Strategy Against the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal

摘要

The main purpose of this thesis is to analyze the counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts of the Government of Nepal (GoN) in the initial stage of the Maoist insurgency (i.e., before the assassination of King Birendra by his son on June 1, 2001.) Birendra was the 10th king of the Shah Dynasty and one of the most popular kings in the history of Nepal. He was assassinated by his oldest son, Crown Prince Deependra, along with almost a dozen other family members and relatives. The main reason for the assassination is alleged to be the King's disapproval of the Crown Prince's choice of a bride. The thesis evaluates the government's effort against the Maoist insurgency and the COIN principles that were used by it with respect to the COIN principles established by the United States (US) joint counterinsurgency doctrine Joint Publication (JP) 3-24, 'Counterinsurgency Operations.' The analysis will focus on the government's response. The COIN principles established by JP 3-24 will be the principal framework for analysis. Some of the principles were partially effective in the initial stage, but most of the principles were not. The main reasons behind the GoN's ineffectiveness in the COIN campaign are as follows: an unstable political situation led to the lack of a strong commitment by the GoN to formulate a well-defined COIN strategy, there was a lack of resources to commit to the counterinsurgency, and there was a lack of adequate international support. There are a number of conspiracy theories behind the development of the Maoist insurgency. In the initial phase of the insurgency, some believed that the king was sponsoring or supporting the Maoists with a goal of weakening the multi-party democratic system. The Nepali Congress's 'senior most leaders have publicly hinted that they suspect that the palace may have played some role in sabotaging anti-Maoist operations.' Hence, the overall COIN effort was not effective until after the assassination in 2001.