Foreign Police Development: The Third Time's the Charm

摘要

One of the most important aspects of governmental development or reform in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment is the growth and sustainment of the police force charged with maintaining law and order. However, despite billions of dollars and a huge United States Government (USG) effort, significant challenges remain in both Iraq and Afghanistan with respect to police organization and development. The majority of the problems in those two countries are the result of early USG mistakes in the police development process, which included the following: (1) not properly defining an organizational end-state for either police organization, and (2) expanding both organizations so quickly that the growth outpaced institutional development. Consequences of this unbalanced approach, which have grown exponentially over time, were that the USG wasted resources and the developing police forces institutionalized bad business practices. In an attempt to prevent the same mistakes from occurring again, this paper reveals what went wrong with police development missions in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.