Dagestan: Moscow's Risk Versus Gain

摘要

Multiple variables factor into the deteriorating security infrastructure within Dagestan today. Corruption, political changes implemented by the Kremlin, and finally, the hard-line tactics of the Russian Federal Security Service have unique consequences on contemporary stability operations. In analyzing the current situation inside Dagestan, global security experts have a unique opportunity to assess Russia's newer hybrid FSB tactics, giving analysts a glimpse of possible vulnerabilities within the organization that have not otherwise been noticed. While disturbing, the FSB's hard-line tactics are relatively effective in containing the spread of extremism within Dagestan. The ratio of FSB operations within Dagestan (resulting in the elimination of two al-Qaeda leaders and 150 militants during 2009) compared to the retaliations perpetrated by militant groups outside Dagestan's borders is remarkably low. So far, a delicate balance between risk versus gain is being maintained. For Moscow, the gain is a reasonable expectation of containing the insurgency. But the risk may prove costly. An old Russian saying implies that Russians do not learn from making mistakes -- they learn from others who make mistakes. Insurgents do not necessarily need to win battles; they simply need to outlast their opponents. Yet to be determined is whether Russia realizes that the harder it suppresses, the harder those being suppressed may continue to fight, even beyond Dagestan's borders. Russia has implemented a harsh counterterrorism campaign in Dagestan, justified by the collateral damage (i.e., civilian casualties), in attempting to enhance Moscow s security policies and as a means of implementing controlled democracy throughout the region. What continues to happen inside Dagestan today does not resemble the hallmark characteristics of terrorism. So why does Russia continue to apply counterterrorism tactics when, in fact, what is occurring is insurgency.