John Boyd and the AirLand Battle Doctrine.

摘要

The U.S. Army underwent significant doctrinal changes in the years following the Vietnam War. The 1976 edition of Field Manual (FM) 100-5, championed by General William DePuy, attempted to guide the Army's actions necessary to defeat the Soviet Union on a European battlefield by utilizing an active defense. This concept generated vigorous debates internal and external to the Army that ultimately led to the 1982 and 1986 editions of FM 100-5, commonly referred to as the AirLand Battle Doctrine. Since that time, numerous authors have attempted to link John Boyd directly to the doctrine's creation, with the most damning claims being that the Army outright plagiarized Boyd's work. However, while there is much writing addressing Boyd and the AirLand Battle Doctrine individually, the current literature does not provide empirically conclusive evidence of this linkage. This research has concluded that there was not a direct correlation between John Boyd's concepts and the AirLand Battle Doctrine; however, similarities between Boyd's work and the doctrine were due to the larger reform movement within the Department of Defense (DoD) preceding and throughout the doctrine's development.