War Powers Resolution: After Thirty-Eight Years.

摘要

Under the Constitution, the war powers are divided between Congress and the President. Congress has the power to declare war and raise and support the armed forces (Article I, section 8), while the President is Commander-in- Chief (Article II, section 2). The Commander-in-Chief role gives the President power to utilize the armed forces to repel attacks against the United States, but there has long been controversy over whether he is constitutionally authorized to send forces into hostile situations abroad without a declaration of war or other congressional authorization. During the Vietnam War, Congress searched for a way to assert authority to decide when the United States should become involved in a war or the armed forces be utilized in circumstances that might lead to hostilities. On Nov 7, 1973, it passed the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148). The main purpose of the Resolution was to establish procedures for both branches to share in decisions that might get the United States involved in war. The drafters sought to circumscribe the President's authority to use armed forces abroad in hostilities or without a declaration of war or other congressional authorization, yet provide enough flexibility to permit him to respond to attack or other emergencies. The record of the War Powers Resolution since its enactment has been mixed, and after 30 years it remains controversial. Some Members of Congress believe the Resolution has on some occasions served as a restraint on the use of armed forces by Presidents, and given Congress a vehicle for asserting its war powers. Others have sought to amend the Resolution because they believe it has failed to assure a congressional voice in committing U.S. troops to potential conflicts abroad. This report examines the provisions of the War Powers Resolution, actual experience in its use from its enactment in 1973 through August 2012, and proposed amendments to it.