China Sanctions for Missile Proliferation: A Bureaucratic Compromise.

摘要

On 12 August 26, 1993, the State Department announced that the United States would impose sanctions against China for transferring missile technology to Pakistan in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), a set of international counter-proliferation guidelines implemented by U.S. law. The formal notice containing details of the sanctions was published on August 27, 1993. News accounts suggested that the Administration was taking this action 'reluctantly.' State Department officials stressed repeatedly that they were required to take the action by law. The clear implication was that Congress had tied their hands. The two laws cited as requiring this action are the Anns Export Control Act (AECA) and the Export Administration Act (EAA). The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that: (1) the constitutional tension between the Executive and Congress in legislation bearing on this subject was not a factor in the sanction decision; (2) contrary to State Department assertions, the Executive had significant discretion under applicable law; and, (3) the Executive decision was a compromise product of competing interests best explained by Allison's 'Bureaucratic Politics Model' of decision-making.' Whether China actually transferred MTCR technology to Pakistan, and whether such a transfer fell within the sanction provisions of U.S. law are beyond the scope of this paper. The focus is on the decision process, not the merits of the decision.