Two Sides of the Same COIN: A Comparative Analysis of American and British Counterinsurgency Approaches at the Turn of the Twentieth Century

摘要

The recent counterinsurgency efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan revitalized interest in counterinsurgency doctrine and practice. After multiple iterations changing approaches from a lethal enemy-centric approach to a whole-of-government population-centric approach, the U.S. Army continues to revise its doctrine Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency to address the needs of the current and anticipated environments. During this revision a debate has come to the forefront questioning which counterinsurgency practices and approaches lead to success. This monograph analyzed two successful counterinsurgencies using a methodology similar to the RAND study Victory Has a Thousand Fathers to test the validity of the most common methods employed in best practice counterinsurgency. While each counterinsurgency campaign is unique and requires employment of different methods, based on the analysis of the two successful campaigns, this monograph suggests that the probability of success in a counterinsurgency campaign increases through using an adaptive approach comprised of mixed-methods.