Plus CA Change, Plus C'Est La Meme Chose (The More Things Change, The More TheyStay the Same) The Difficulty in Increasing Operational Movement Rates

摘要

The movement of major combat, combat support, and combat service support units tothe decisive place and time on the battlefield is the commander's operational art. Effectively integrating, controlling, and supporting motor, rail, air, and water modes of intratheater transportation is science. Despite the greater speed of the vehicles, trains, aircraft, and ships involved, statistical comparisons between World War II and Korean War campaigns and recent actions in similar terrain indicate U.S. corps have not improved their ability to conduct operational movements. In desert terrain, Operation DESERT STORM's VII and XVIII Corps did not move to their forward assembly areas any faster than elements of First Army or U Corps did during Operation TORCH. In urban terrain, REFORGER's III Corps did not move faster than its predecessor during the Ardennes offensive. In mountainous terrain, time-distance analysis shows that an armored reinforcing corps could not move from port to sector as rapidly as X Corps did in defending the Line D. Deficiencies in doctrine, equipment, organization, and training inhibit corps from increasing their movement rate. Current U.S. Army doctrine is not specific or holistic enough to be treated as a science. Doctrine becomes more vague as movements become more complex. Doctrine does not prescribe equipment, organization, and training necessary to support faster movements. Equipment