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Can budget institutions counteract political indiscipline?

机译:预算机构可以抵制政治纪律吗?

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The budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities.We confirm this proposition for a group of new and potential members of the European Union, finding that politics dominates.The contemporary practice of democracy can increase budget deficits through not only ideological preferences,but also more fragmented government coalitions and higher voter participation.Long-term structural forces, triggered by societal divisions and representative electoral rules,have more ambigu- ous implications but also appear to increase budget pressures,as others have also found.However,our most robust,and hopeful,finding is that budget institutions - mechanisms and rules of the budget process - that create checks and balances have significant value in curbing fiscal pressures even when the politics is repre- sentative but undisciplined,and when long-term structural forces are unfavourable.
机译:预算是政治优先事项而不是经济优先事项的表达。我们对一群新的和潜在的欧盟成员国证实了这一主张,发现政治占主导地位。当代的民主实践不仅可以通过意识形态偏好,而且可以增加预算赤字。其他人也发现,由社会分裂和代议制选举规则引发的长期结构性力量具有更多含糊的含义,但似乎也增加了预算压力。而且,希望能够发现的是,即使在政治上代表但不纪律,长期结构力量不利的情况下,建立制衡机制的预算机构(预算程序的机制和规则)在抑制财政压力方面也具有重要价值。 。

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