Individuals share a common interest in the provision of public goods. Therefore they might be expected to act in a way that furthers this common interest and to jointly strive for a provision level that maximizes the welfare of the whole group of individuals. However, as Mancur Olson (1965, p. 2) already argued in his seminal book on the logic of collective action, 'rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests'.The voluntary contribution model of public good provision, which explicitly adopts a non-cooperative game-theoretic approach, suggests as a general presumption that self-interested individuals who independently choose their contribution levels will generate a suboptimal level of the public good (Cornes and Sandler 1985; Bergstrom et al. 1986).
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机译：个人在提供公共物品方面有着共同的利益。因此，可以期望他们以促进这一共同利益的方式采取行动，并共同努力实现使整个个人群体的福利最大化的规定水平。但是，正如曼库尔·奥尔森（Mancur Olson，1965，第2页）在其关于集体行动的逻辑的开创性著作中所指出的那样，``理性的，自利的个人将不会为实现其共同或集体利益而行动''。良好的供给明确采用了非合作博弈论的方法，它提出了一个普遍的假设，即独立选择贡献水平的自利个人将产生次优的公共物品水平（Cornes and Sandler 1985; Bergstrom等。 1986）。
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