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Anchors and norms in anonymous pay-what-you-want pricing contexts

机译:匿名付费定价环境中的锚定和规范

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In this paper, we examine whether him supplied numbers influence reported payments in anonymous pay-what-you-want (PWYW) exchanges. PWYW allows consumers to select any level of voluntary payment. Using two experiments, we find that consumers voluntarily report payments greater than zero on average in the absence of social pressure. Further, reported voluntary payments are influenced by numbers in the exchange context. When higher numbers are present, consumers respond by reporting they would make higher payments. However, the meaning of the number is also important. When the number represents a descriptive norm (what others are doing), it is more predictive of reported payments compared to a number that represents an injunctive norm (what is the "correct" thing to do) in some cases. Our results indicate that PWYW may indeed be feasible for products that are purchased anonymously and that firms can strategically provide information that affects payments. Published by Elsevier Inc.
机译:在本文中,我们检查了他是否提供了数字影响,以匿名付款方式(PWYW)交易所付款。 PWYW允许消费者选择任何自愿付款。 使用两个实验,我们发现消费者在没有社会压力的情况下平均报告了大于零的付款。 此外,报告的自愿付款在交换环境中受数字的影响。 当存在较高的数字时,消费者通过报告他们将付款更高的付款来做出回应。 但是,数字的含义也很重要。 当数字代表描述性规范(其他人在做什么)时,与代表禁令规范(在某些情况下要做什么是“正确”的事情)相比,它更可预测报告的付款。 我们的结果表明,PWYW确实对于匿名购买的产品可能确实是可行的,并且公司可以从战略上提供影响付款的信息。 由Elsevier Inc.出版

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