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The 'hidden costs' of water provision: New evidence from the relationship between contracting-out and price in French water public services

机译:供水的“隐性成本”:法国水务公共事业中外包与价格之间关系的新证据

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In France, the management of public services such as water or sanitation can be done by the municipal council or contracted out to a private operator. This paper quantifies the impact of the choice of contracting out the management of water public services on price. It uses a unique dataset of utilities with unusual detailed financial indicators, such as debt of the water public service. We find evidence that private management is associated with higher prices on average ceteris paribus but that this difference disappears when we account for the 'hidden costs' of water, i.e. the price taking into consideration debt refunding of the public service which could increase the price in the following years. Indeed, private management is characterized by higher tariffs but lower debt level so that the price ensure the full-costs recovery while under public management, prices are set at a lower level than under private management but with a higher debt of the public service. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译:在法国,公共服务(如水或卫生设施)的管理可以由市议会进行,也可以外包给私人运营商。本文量化了选择将水务公共服务管理外包对价格的影响。它使用具有独特的详细财务指标的公用事业唯一数据集,例如水利公共服务部门的债务。我们发现有证据表明,私人管理与平均塞比教徒的较高价格有关,但是当我们考虑到水的“隐性成本”时,即当考虑到公共服务的债务退还可能会增加价格时,这种差异就消失了。接下来的几年。的确,私人管理的特点是较高的关税,但债务水平较低,因此价格确保了全额收回成本,而在公共管理下,价格被定为低于私人管理下的价格,但公共服务的债务却较高。 (C)2017 Elsevier Ltd.保留所有权利。

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