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Reputation and influence in charitable giving: an experiment

机译:慈善捐赠中的声誉和影响力:一项实验

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Previous experimental and observational work suggests that people act more generously when they are observed and observe others in social settings. However, the explanation for this is unclear. An individual may want to send a signal of her generosity to improve her own reputation. Alternately (or additionally) she may value the public good or charity itself and, believing that contribution levels are strategic complements, give more to influence others to give more. We perform the first series of laboratory experiments that can separately estimate the impact of these two social effects, and test whether realized influence is consistent with the desire to influence, and whether either of these are consistent with anticipated influence. Our experimental subjects were given the opportunity to contribute from their endowment to Bread for the World, a development NGO. Depending on treatment, "leader" subjects' donations were reported to other subjects either anonymously or with their identities, and these were reported either before these "follower" subjects made their donation decisions. We find that "leaders" are influential only when their identities are revealed along with their donations, and female leaders are more influential than males. Identified leaders' predictions suggest that are aware of their influence. They respond to this by giving more than either the control group or the unidentified leaders. We find mixed evidence for "reputation-seeking."
机译:先前的实验和观察工作表明,当人们观察并在社交环境中观察他人时,他们的行为更为慷慨。但是,对此的解释不清楚。一个人可能想发送一个慷慨的信号,以提高自己的声誉。替代地(或附加地),她可以珍惜公共利益或慈善本身,并认为贡献水平是战略性的补充,可以做出更多贡献来影响他人做出更多贡献。我们执行第一系列的实验室实验,可以分别估计这两种社会效应的影响,并测试实现的影响是否与影响的愿望一致,以及这些影响是否与预期的影响一致。我们的实验对象有机会从他们的捐赠中为发展中的非政府组织“世界面包”捐款。根据处理方式,“领导者”受试者的捐赠会匿名或以其他人的身份报告给其他受试者,并且在这些“跟随者”受试者做出捐赠决定之前进行报告。我们发现,“领导者”只有在捐赠者的身份和捐赠被揭示时才具有影响力,而女性领导者比男性领导者更有影响力。确定的领导人的预测表明他们已经意识到自己的影响。他们通过给予比控制组或身份不明的领导人更多的钱来回应这一问题。我们发现“寻求声誉”的证​​据不一。

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