State and Agents in China: Disciplining Government Officials

摘要

Yongshun Cai，s new book discusses agent management by focusing on the political rationale behind the state's use of selective or differentiated discipline. In order for the government to menace officials and contain rampant corruption while reducing costs, the state authority uses selective or differentiated discipline to balance the need for, and the difficulties in, disciplining agents. What kinds of officials are "selected" as targets? The criteria for punislunent are based on (1) the severity of the consequences of the official's failure in performing his or her duties, and (2) his or her role or responsibility in the failure. Cai also argues that the state's tolerance varies depending on the type of malfeasance. The state authority is more likely to tolerate duty-related malfeasance, especially cases with less severe consequences or cases that are not directly caused by government officials. Although some agents have been exempted or given less serious punishment, whether a particular agent will be held liable may not be predetermined. Inconsistency in the disciplining of erring agents implies uncertainty. When the party-state decides to mete out punishment, the penalty can be harsh and career ending. For this reason, state agents in China are strongly motivated to avoid blame and punishment by adopting various strategies, from covering up their malfeasance to seeking help through personal connections.