WHEN DO STRATEGIC ALLIANCES INHIBIT INNOVATION BY FIRMS? EVIDENCE FROM PATENT POOLS IN THE GLOBAL OPTICAL DISC INDUSTRY

摘要

In recent years, strategic management scholars have increased their examination of the role that patents and other forms of intellectual property (IP) protection plays with respect to firm performance (Reitzig and Puranam, 2009; Somaya, 2003; Ziedonis, 2004). While this research sheds light on an important aspect of what is now called the IP strategy of firms, the impact of research and development (R&D) consortia on innovation remains relatively unexplored. Specifically, little research exists on the phenomena of patent pools and their effect on firm performance. 'A 'patent pool' is an agreement between two or more patent owners to license one or more of their patents to one another or third parties' (Clarket ah, 2000: 4). At its most fundamental level, a patent pool represents a formal knowledge sharing arrangement that aggregates IP rights among multiple entities for the purpose of developing and commercializing new technology-based products. This contractual relationship requires explicit approval from regulatory authorities over anticompetitive concerns and constitutes a legally recognized R&D consortium, which is a specialized form of strategic alliance. Patent pools are composed of two types of participant firms: licensors and licensees. Licensors are firms that own the essential patents, which are the core intellectual assets of the patent pool. Licensees are firms that purchase the right to use these patents in the design of various products. Nonparticipants are firms within the same industry that are not part of the patent pool.Until recently, patent pools were a rare occurrence and typically failed to obtain regulatory approval because of concerns about active collusion among licensors. Of the 24 patent pools