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Resolving water allocation conflicts using WEAP simulation model and non-cooperative game theory

机译:使用WEAP模拟模型和非合作博弈理论解决水资源分配冲突

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摘要

Disparity in water supply and demand often leads to conflicts among users over water resources in basins. Game theory is a new tool recently employed for resolving such conflicts. The present study uses non-cooperative games to resolve the conflicts in the Zayandehroud basin. The games are simulated between two stakeholders by the graph model conflict resolution (GMCR) method as one of the non-cooperative methods. The stakeholders are Isfahan Regional Water Company (IRWC) and Agriculture-Jahad Organization (AJO). Stakeholders can execute some strategies competitively, which include A: developing farming lands, B: improving irrigation efficiency, C: controlling withdrawals from aquifers, and D: selling water to the industrial sector. A and B are executed by AJO and C and D are executed by IRWC. The sustainable water allocation scenarios are obtained by GMCR and employed in a water evaluation and planning simulation model to supply consumers' water demand. The best sustainable scenario selected based on GMCR concepts requires irrigation efficiency of agricultural lands to be improved in order to achieve a demand meeting index of 90% and, in contrast, there will be not control on water withdrawal from aquifers.
机译:供水和需求的差异常常导致流域水资源使用者之间的冲突。博弈论是最近用于解决此类冲突的一种新工具。本研究使用非合作博弈来解决Zayandehroud盆地的冲突。通过作为非合作方法之一的图模型冲突解决(GMCR)方法在两个利益相关者之间模拟了游戏。利益相关者是伊斯法罕地区水公司(IRWC)和农业贾哈德组织(AJO)。利益相关者可以竞争性地执行一些策略,包括A:开发耕地,B:提高灌溉效率,C:控制从含水层中抽水,以及D:向工业部门出售水。 A和B由AJO执行,C和D由IRWC执行。可持续水分配方案是由GMCR获得的,并用于水评估和规划模拟模型中,以满足消费者的用水需求。根据GMCR概念选择的最佳可持续方案要求提高农田的灌溉效率,以达到90%的需求指数,与此相反,将无法控制从含水层中抽水。

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