Is Imitation Bad for the Production of Creative Works?

摘要

This paper develops a theoretical framework to discuss the positive roleof imitative works where creators often have private information about their creativeabilities and may need outside investment. Within this framework, weconsider the impact of three types of copyright protection during the differentstages: the production, distribution, and consumption of creative works. Differenttypes of enforcement can discourage imitation (production-side enforcement),limit distribution (supply-side enforcement), and restrict consumption (demandsideenforcement) of unauthorized copies of creative works. The last two types ofinfringement are called end-user piracy since these involve end-users, whoactively search and illegally access creative works. The main results show thatsubstitutability exists between copyright protection against end-user piracy sinceboth types of enforcement increase the creator’s incentive with a higher return.However, it cannot solve the inefficient investment problem due to informationasymmetry. There exists complementarity between copyright protection againstend-user piracy and imitation. When weak protection against end-user piracyyields the overproduction of creative works, a high level of protection againstimitation can minimize the related inefficiencies. However, when end-user piracyenforcement increases and brings underproduction, imitative works can benefitsociety.