I study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object to one of N risk-neutral bidders with heterogeneous preferences. The auctioneer does not know bidders 'preferences but has private information about the characteristics of the object, and must decide how much information to reveal prior to the auction. I show that the auctioneer has incentives to release less information than would be efficient and that the amount of information released increases with the level of competition (as measured by the number of bidders). Furthermore, in a perfectly competitive market the auctioneer would provide the efficient level of information. LaDy Brandon treats her guests exactly as an auctioneer treats his objects. She either explains them entirely away, or tells one everything about them except what one wants to know.
展开▼
机译：我研究了一个拍卖商希望将对象出售给具有不同偏好的N个风险中立投标人之一的情况。拍卖师不知道投标人的偏好，但拥有有关物品特征的私人信息，因此必须决定在拍卖前要透露多少信息。我表明，拍卖师有动力来发布比有效信息少的信息，并且所发布的信息量会随着竞争水平的提高而增加（以投标人的数量来衡量）。此外，在完全竞争的市场中，拍卖师将提供有效的信息水平。 LaDy Brandon对待客人的方式与拍卖师对待其物品的方式完全相同。她要么完全把它们解释掉，要么告诉他们除了他们想知道的以外的所有事情。
展开▼
