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The Self and the Other: Liberalism and Gandhi

机译:自我与他人:自由主义与甘地

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This paper makes an attempt to philosophically re-construct what I have termed as a fundamental paradox at the heart of deontological liberalism. It is argued that liberalism attempts to create the possibilities of rational consensus and of bringing people together socially and politically by developing methodologies which overcome the divisive nature of essentially parochial substantive conceptions of the good. Such methodologies relying on the supposed universally valid dictates of reason and notions of procedural rationality proceed by disengaging men from the divisive particularities of their plural value contexts. That disengagement is sought to be achieved by conceptualizing the individual as self sufficient in her moral and epistemic being thereby conceptually isolating individual man from the other. The liberal effort to create rational consensus which can bring people together then gets off the ground by isolating the individual from the other. This I have termed as the paradox of the self and the other or alternatively the paradox of social atomism and universalism. As a possible philosophical alternative this paper makes an attempt to re-construct Gandhi’s conceptualization of the relationship between swaraj as self rule and Satyagraha as non-violent resistance. This Gandhian connection, it is argued, has the potential to transform the moral psychology of our response to the other, thereby posing a challenge to the modern, predominantly liberal, conceptualization of such a response.
机译:本文试图从哲学上重建我所谓的论论论自由主义核心的基本悖论。有人认为,自由主义试图通过发展克服本质上狭och的实质性实体概念的分裂性的方法,来创造理性共识的可能性,并在社会和政治上使人们团结在一起。这样的方法论依靠假定的普遍有效的理性指示和程序理性的观念,是通过使人们脱离其多元价值情境的分裂特殊性来进行的。通过将个体概念化为自我充实的道德和认识论,从而在概念上将个体与他人隔离,来寻求这种脱离。为建立可以使人们团结在一起的理性共识而进行的自由努力随后通过将个人与其他人隔离开来。我把这称为自我悖论,也称为社会原子论和普遍主义的另一悖论。作为一种可能的哲学选择,本文尝试重新构造甘地关于“沙瓦拉”(Swaraj)作为“自我统治”和“ Satyagraha”(非暴力抵抗)之间关系的概念。有人认为,这种甘地人的联系有可能改变我们对另一种回应的道德心理,从而对这种回应的现代的,主要是自由的概念化构成挑战。

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