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Purchasing Scarce Products Under Dynamic Pricing: An Experimental Investigation

机译:动态定价下购买稀有产品的实验研究

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Whereas theoretical studies on dynamic pricing typically assume that consumers are either fully strategic or fully myopic, systematic empirical investigations into how consumers behave under dynamic pricing contexts are relatively rare. Focusing on scarce products, we constructed and experimentally tested a two-stage model in which a firm sells a seasonal good under exogenous inventory constraints to a market of strategic buyers. In our experiment, subjects assigned the role of buyers made purchase decisions in response to prices set by an automated seller. We find that equilibrium predictions assuming fully strategic buyers largely accounted for aggregate behavior in the experiment, and the ex post optimal decisions for subjects were overwhelmingly consistent with equilibrium prescriptions. Moreover, subjects tended to become individually more strategic as the session progressed. However, there were also nuanced systematic patterns of deviations from equilibrium that had profit and pricing implications for the seller. First, a nonnegligible minority of subjects exhibited completely myopic buying behavior even with practice. Second, when the product was relatively more scarce, myopic buying had a stronger impact on demand at higher prices; the upshot is that the seller's season-profit-maximizing price could be considerably higher than what would be optimal with fully strategic buyers.
机译:尽管有关动态定价的理论研究通常假设消费者是完全战略的或完全近视的,但是相对较少的关于消费者在动态定价背景下的行为的系统性经验研究。针对稀缺产品,我们构建并通过实验测试了一个两阶段模型,在该模型中,公司在外部库存限制下向策略性买方市场出售季节性商品。在我们的实验中,指定买方角色的主体根据自动卖方设定的价格做出购买决策。我们发现,假设完全战略买家的均衡预测在很大程度上说明了实验中的总体行为,而事后对目标的最佳决策则与均衡处方绝大多数一致。此外,随着会议的进行,主题倾向于变得更具策略性。但是,也存在细微的偏离均衡的系统模式,对卖方有利润和定价的影响。首先,少数人即使实践也表现出完全近视的购买行为。其次,当产品相对稀缺时,近视购买对价格较高的需求产生了更大的影响。结果是,卖方的当季利润最大化价格可能远高于完全战略买方的最优价格。

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