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Rethinking The Ends of Harm

机译:重新思考危害的终结

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摘要

In The Ends of Harm, Victor Tadros claims that the general justifying aim of the criminal law should be general deterrence. He also takes seriously that we cannot use people as a means, and thus he argues that we may only punish people in the name of general deterrence who have a ‘duty’ to suffer. Tadros claims that this duty arises as follows: An offender initially has a duty not to harm the victim. If the offender violates that duty, the offender still has a duty to stop the harm from occurring (so that, for example, an offender would have to jump in front of his own bullet). And if the harm does occur, then the offender has a duty to rectify that harm. This duty to rectify, argues Tadros, requires the defendant not only to compensate the victim but also to protect the victim to the extent that he would have been able to have been harmed to prevent the threat from occurring. Tadros further advances intricate arguments for why the state may therefore punish the offender to protect other potential victims to the extent of the offender’s duty to rectify. This symposium contribution seeks to explore three problems with Tadros’ analysis, ultimately arguing that Tadros’ theory fails on its own terms. First, attempts present a substantial problem for Tadros’ regime because attempts do not give rise to duties to prevent harm because there is no harm to be prevented. Tadros’ attempt to account for attempts, as completed offenses of diversions of security resources, ultimately leads to punishments that bear little resemblance to the crime attempted. Such a wildly counterintuitive result creates problems for a regime premised on general deterrence, which must be understood and respected. Second, Tadros’ regime will often exempt the rich from suffering criminal punishment. Tadros claims that duties to prevent harms from occurring (by jumping in front of bullets) are only enforceable when compensation will be inadequate. However, affluent offenders may be able to fully compensate. Moreover, since the scope of the duty to suffer will be determined by what remains of the duty after the victim is compensated, affluent offenders will be able to compensate more and thereby suffer less. Again, the actual sentences will thereby bear little resemblance to the rationale for criminalization, thus threatening the deterrent message of the law. Moreover, a system that exacerbates distributive inequalities will not achieve public respect. Third, Tadros cannot justify taking the duty that the defendant owes to the victim and forcing the victim to transfer this asset to the state. In his quest to articulate a theory that does not impermissibly use defendants, he ultimately endorses a theory that impermissibly uses their victims. He thus fails to achieve the very goal he sets for himself, which is to achieve general deterrence without impermissibly using anyone.
机译:维克多·塔德罗斯(Victor Tadros)在《危害的尽头》中声称,刑法的一般正当目的应该是普遍威慑。他还非常重视我们不能以人为手段,因此,他认为我们只能以具有普遍性威慑力的人的名义惩罚那些负有“责任”的人。塔德罗斯(Tadros)声称,这项义务的产生如下:犯罪者最初有义务不伤害受害者。如果罪犯违反了该义务,罪犯仍然有义务阻止伤害发生(例如,罪犯必须跳到自己的子弹前)。如果确实发生了损害,那么犯罪者有责任纠正这种损害。塔德罗斯认为,这种矫正的责任要求被告不仅要赔偿受害者,而且还应在一定程度上保护受害者,使其本可以受到伤害以防止威胁发生。 Tadros进一步提出了复杂的论点,即为什么国家可能会在犯罪者的纠正责任范围内惩罚犯罪者以保护其他潜在受害者。这次专题讨论会的目的是探讨塔德罗斯的分析中的三个问题,最终认为塔德罗斯的理论按其自身的观点是失败的。首先,对塔德罗斯政权而言,企图提出了一个实质性问题,因为企图并没有引起预防伤害的责任,因为没有可以预防的伤害。塔德罗斯(Tadros)企图将企图解释为完全挪用安全资源的罪行,最终导致与所企图的罪行几乎没有相似之处的惩罚。如此反直觉的结果给以普遍威慑为前提的政权带来了问题,必须理解和尊重。其次,塔德罗斯(Tadros)政权通常会免除富人的刑事处罚。塔德罗斯(Tadros)声称,只有在赔偿不足时,才能执行防止伤害发生的责任(跳到子弹头)。但是,富裕的犯罪者可能能够完全赔偿。而且,由于受害义务的范围将由受害人得到补偿后剩下的义务来决定,因此,富裕的罪犯将能够获得更多的赔偿,从而减少遭受的损失。同样,实际的刑罚将因此与定罪的理由很少相似,从而威胁到法律的威慑信息。此外,加剧分配不平等的制度将无法获得公众的尊重。第三,塔德罗斯(Tadros)无法证明被告应负受害人的责任并强迫受害人将该资产转移给国家。为了表达一种不会滥用被告的理论,他最终认可了一种不允许滥用被告的理论。因此,他无法实现自己为自己设定的目标,即实现普遍的威慑作用,而不允许他人使用。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Law and Philosophy》 |2013年第3期|177-198|共22页
  • 作者

    Kimberly Kessler Ferzan;

  • 作者单位

    Rutgers University School of Law">(1);

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  • 正文语种 eng
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