Quine and Slater on Paraconsistency and Deviance

摘要

In a famous and controversial paper, B. H. Slater has argued against the possibility of paraconsistent logics. Our reply is centred on the distinction between two aspects of the meaning of a logical constant *c* in a given logic: its operational meaning, given by the operational rules for *c* in a cut-free sequent calculus for the logic at issue, and its global meaning, specified by the sequents containing *c* which can be proved in the same calculus. Subsequently, we use the same strategy to counter Quine's meaning variance argument against deviant logics. In a nutshell, we claim that genuine rivalry between (similar) logics *L* and *L* is possible whenever each constant in *L* has the same operational meaning as its counterpart in *L* although differences in global meaning arise in at least one case.deviant logics - logical pluralism - paraconsistent logics - proof-theoretic semantics - Quine - substructural logics