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Social choice and the logic of simple games

机译:社会选择和简单游戏的逻辑

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Using Pauly's majority logic, a modal-like language that describes decisions of a collective of agents, this article develops an explicit relationship between logic and social choice theory, particularly judgement aggregation. Majority logic is, within certain limits, able to express properties of decision procedures that are used to reach collective judgements. Those properties are often facts about the validity of logical inference rules at the level of collective decision making. From the perspective of social choice theory, formulae of majority logic can be regarded as axioms about the possibility of correct collective inference. Exploring the link with modal logic, and using so-called simple games as the mathematical structures representing decision procedures, we argue that the axiomatizations of social choice theorists mimic definability results from the perspective of modal logicians. Sets of formulae of majority logic define classes of decision procedures in this sense. Based on simple games, we give a game-theoretic characterization of properties of decision procedures that can be expressed using majority logic. From this, we deduce the closure conditions on classes of decision procedures that are definable using majority logic. This establishes a concrete link between a language in which axioms may be formulated, and the properties of decision procedures that it is able to characterize. Closure conditions also allow us to determine limits to the expressive and axiomatic power of majority logic. Since much of social choice theory is occupied with finding decision procedures that admit valid collective inference, and this is the domain of majority logic, quite a few familiar classes of decision procedures are definable. However, we show that majority logic is too weak to express non-dictatorship-in effect a language-relative impossibility result. We relate these definability results to recent results obtained in the judgement aggregation literature, in particular to some of the impossibility results.
机译:本文使用保利的多数逻辑(一种描述了一组代理人的决定的模态语言),在逻辑和社会选择理论之间建立了明确的关系,尤其是判断聚合。在一定范围内,多数逻辑能够表达用于达成集体判断的决策程序的属性。这些属性通常是关于逻辑推理规则在集体决策水平上有效性的事实。从社会选择理论的角度来看,多数逻辑公式可以视为关于正确的集体推理可能性的公理。探索与模态逻辑的联系,并使用所谓的简单博弈作为代表决策程序的数学结构,我们认为,社会选择理论家的公理化模仿了模态逻辑学家的定义。在这种意义上,多数逻辑公式集定义了决策程序的类别。基于简单博弈,我们对可以使用多数逻辑表示的决策程序属性进行博弈论表征。据此,我们推导了使用多数逻辑可定义的决策程序类的关闭条件。这在可以制定公理的语言与它可以表征的决策程序的属性之间建立了具体的联系。封闭条件还使我们能够确定多数逻辑的表达和公理能力的极限。由于许多社会选择理论都忙于寻找可以接受有效集体推理的决策程序,而这是多数逻辑的领域,因此可以定义许多熟悉的决策程序类别。但是,我们证明多数逻辑太弱而无法表达非独裁性,实际上是相对于语言的不可能结果。我们将这些可定义性结果与判断汇总文献中获得的最新结果相关,尤其是与一些不可能的结果相关联。

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