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Tasmanian landowner preferences for conservation incentive programs: A latent class approach

机译:塔斯马尼亚州土地所有者对保护奖励计划的偏好:一种潜在的阶级方法

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摘要

An empirical model of landowners' conservation incentive program choice is developed in which information about landowners' socio-economic and property characteristics and their attitudes, is combined with incentive program attributes. In a Choice survey landowners were presented with the choice of two incentive programs modelled as 'bundles of attributes' mimicking a voluntary choice scenario. Landowner behaviour and decision and the type of conditions and regulations they preferred were analyzed. Based on choice survey data, landowner heterogeneity was accounted for using a latent class approach to estimate the preference parameters. Three latent classes of landowners with different attitudes to the role and outcome of establishing conservation reserves on private land were identified: multi-objective owners; environment owners; and production owners. Only a small proportion of landowners, mostly environment owners, would voluntarily join a program. Although compensation funding contributed to voluntary program choice for multi-objective owners and environment owners, welfare losses were around 4000 AUD per hectare, which is less than the average agricultural land value in Tasmania. Landowners for whom compensation funding contributed to voluntary program choice were also most likely to set aside land for conservation without payment. This raises the possibility that the government's compensation expenditure could potentially be either reduced or re-allocated to landowners who will not voluntarily take conservation action. Increasing participation in conservation incentive programs and minimizing the welfare losses associated with meeting conservation targets may be best achieved by offering programs that allow flexibility in terms of legal arrangements and other program attributes.%Commonwealth Science and Industry Research Organisation, Marine and Atmospheric Research, CPO Box J583, Hobart, Tasmania 7001, Australia ;University of Tasmania, Economics and Finance, Private Bag 85, Hobart, Tasmania 7001, Australia ;University of Technology Sydney, School of Marketing, PO Box 123, Broadway, NSW 2007, Australia ;University of Technology Sydney, Mathematical Sciences, PO Box 123, Broadway, NSW 2007, Australia;
机译:建立了土地所有者保护激励方案选择的经验模型,该模型将有关土地所有者的社会经济和财产特征及其态度的信息与激励方案的属性相结合。在“选择”调查中,向土地所有者展示了两个模仿自愿选择方案的激励计划,这些激励计划被建模为“属性捆绑”。分析了土地所有者的行为和决策以及他们偏爱的条件和法规的类型。根据选择调查数据,使用潜在类方法估算偏好参数来考虑土地所有者的异质性。确定了三个潜在类别的土地所有者,他们对在私人土地上建立保护区的作用和结果持不同态度:多目标所有者;环境所有者;和生产所有者。只有一小部分土地所有者(主要是环境所有者)会自愿加入该计划。尽管补偿资金有助于多目标所有者和环境所有者自愿选择方案,但福利损失约为每公顷4000澳元,低于塔斯马尼亚州的平均农业用地价值。补偿资金促成自愿性方案选择的土地所有者也最有可能无偿留出土地进行保护。这增加了政府的补偿支出可能会减少或重新分配给不会自愿采取保护行动的土地所有者的可能性。通过提供在法律安排和其他计划属性方面具有灵活性的计划,可以最好地实现增加对环境保护奖励计划的参与,并最大程度地减少与实现保护目标有关的福利损失。%CPO海洋科学与工业研究组织,CPO邮箱J583,霍巴特,塔斯马尼亚7001,澳大利亚;塔斯马尼亚大学,经济学和金融学,Private Bag 85,霍巴特,塔斯马尼亚7001,澳大利亚;悉尼大学​​,市场学院,PO Box 123,百老汇,新南威尔士州2007,澳大利亚;大学悉尼科技学院数学科学系,PO Box 123,百老汇,新南威尔士州2007,澳大利亚;

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