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Improving interaction mechanism of carbon reduction technology innovation between supply chain enterprises and government by means of differential game

机译:通过差异游戏提高供应链企业与政府碳减排技术创新的互动机制

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For encouraging the manufacturer and supplier to innovate in carbon reduction technology, the government tends to set a number of mandatory standards and some punitive measures in practice. However, research on the regulatory ability of the government and the relationship between governmental regulation and enterprises & rsquo; carbon reduction technology innovation is often neglected. Thus, the bilateral interaction mechanism between the government and enterprises should be established in which enterprises and governments constantly adjust individual decisions to response to the other, so as to improve the carbon emission reduction of enterprises and the level of government regulation. We use differential game methods to study the interaction between carbon reduction technology innovation and government intervention under decentralized decision without cost sharing, decentralized decision with cost sharing and centralized decision respectively. We find that the optimal level of carbon reduction technology innovation under decentralized decision is the same as centralized situation when there is no cost sharing. Furthermore, the optimal levels of government intervention are also the same in both cases. However, the optimal level of carbon reduction technology innovation and government intervention will be improved only in the case that cost-sharing proportion reaches a certain range. Therefore, a positive interaction mechanism between carbon reduction technology innovation of enterprise and intervention of government can be established. Theoretically, our paper reveals a new perspective in the research of the relationship between government and enterprises in the process of carbon reduction technology innovation and use differential game methods to study the interaction between carbon reduction technology innovation and government intervention. In practice, this paper can help government and enterprises to form a closer cooperative relationship in reducing carbon emissions. The government should give full consideration for enterprises & rsquo; actual production capacity when taking intervention measures. Meanwhile, enterprises should refer to the intervention indicators of the government when conducting carbon reduction technology innovations. (c) 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译:为了鼓励制造商和供应商在碳减排技术中创新,政府倾向于制定一些强制性标准和一些惩罚性措施在实践中。但是,研究政府的监管能力以及政府监管与企业的关系’碳还原技术创新往往被忽视。因此,应建立政府和企业之间的双边互动机制,其中企业和政府不断调整个人决定,以改善企业的碳排放量和政府监管水平。我们使用差异游戏方法研究碳减排技术创新与政府干预之间的相互作用,在没有成本共享的情况下,分别与成本共享和集中决定的分散决定。我们发现分散决策下的碳减排技术创新的最佳水平与没有成本共享时的集中状况相同。此外,两种情况下,政府干预的最佳水平也是如此。然而,只有在成本分摊比例达到一定范围的情况下,才能改善最佳碳减排技术创新和政府干预水平。因此,可以建立碳减排技术创新与政府干预之间的积极相互作用机制。从理论上讲,我们的论文揭示了在碳减排技术创新过程中的政府与企业之间关系的新视角,并使用差异游戏方法研究碳减排技术创新与政府干预之间的互动。在实践中,本文可以帮助政府和企业在减少碳排放时形成更密切的合作关系。政府应充分考虑企业和rsquo;采取干预措施时的实际生产能力。与此同时,企业应在进行碳减排技术创新时参考政府的干预指标。 (c)2021 elestvier有限公司保留所有权利。

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