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Prisoners' dilemma misleads business and policy making

机译:囚徒困境误导了商业和政策制定

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The prisoners' dilemma is a game-theoretical construct about trust. It can be seen as a simple version of the 'tragedy of the commons', which is often used in the sustainability context as a metaphor for the tension between responsibility for common resources and the perceived self-benefit to individual organizations, regions or nations who neglect such responsibility in the short term. However, other game theory and developments in sustainability science imply that the prisoners' dilemma mind-set is delusive and misleading for both business and policy making. It helps obscure an even more important aspect of proactive leadership for sustainability: the potential self-benefit of understanding the dynamics of major system change better than one's 'competitors'. The UN 1972,1992; and 2012 summits on sustainability, as well as the many summits on climate change, have been valuable milestones for influencing societal leadership at all levels. However, due to the prisoners' dilemma mind-set, they have also indirectly helped reinforce the idea that sustainability only pays off if the costs of achieving it are shared by all. That, in turn, has encouraged decision makers to believe that 'our organization's, region's or nation's sustainability activity must rely on policy making changing the rules of the game for everybody'. This focus on policy making as the only or main facilitator of sustainability efforts delays the needed transition of global society. By considering game theory such as tit-for-tat and modern systems science for sustainability, this paper illuminates major shortcomings of the prisoners' dilemma in the context of sustainability, and attempts to provide a more fruitful mind-set that can be motivated both theoretically and empirically. It is argued that a large part of the self-benefit of proactivity for sustainability is direct, i.e. independent of other actors' actions for the common good. In addition, it is argued that the self-benefit to businesses can be further increased through voluntary collaboration with other businesses to promote the common good, as well as through collaboration between proactive businesses and policy makers. Currently, none of this is intelligently and operationally part of mainstream leadership and public discourse on sustainability. The clarifications provided in this paper can lead to a much needed shift in mind-set among many leaders, not least political leaders, many of which seem to be trapped in simplistic prisoners' dilemma thinking and who act accordingly. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
机译:囚徒的困境是关于信任的博弈论建构。可以将其视为“公地悲剧”的简单版本,它经常在可持续性背景下用作隐喻,以显示对共同资源的责任与对单个组织,地区或国家的自利之间的紧张关系。在短期内忽略这种责任。但是,其他博弈论和可持续发展科学的发展也意味着,囚犯的困境思维方式对商业和政策制定都具有欺骗性和误导性。它有助于掩盖主动领导力对可持续发展的一个甚至更重要的方面:理解主要系统的动态变化所产生的潜在自我利益要比一个人的“竞争者”更好。联合国1972,1992; 2012年可持续发展峰会以及许多气候变化峰会,是影响各级社会领导能力的重要里程碑。但是,由于囚犯的思维定势,他们也间接地增强了这样一种观念,即只有所有人共同承担实现可持续性的代价,可持续性才能获得回报。反过来,这又鼓励决策者相信“我们组织,地区或国家的可持续性活动必须依靠为每个人改变游戏规则的政策制定”。作为可持续发展努力的唯一或主要推动者,将政策制定作为重点,这延迟了全球社会所需的过渡。通过考虑如针锋相对的博弈论和现代系统科学的可持续性,本文阐明了可持续性背景下囚犯困境的主要缺陷,并试图提供一种更富有成果的思维方式,这在理论上可以被激发和经验。有人认为,主动性对可持续性的很大一部分是直接的,即独立于其他行为者的共同利益。此外,有人认为,可以通过与其他企业自愿合作以促进共同利益,以及通过主动企业与政策制定者之间的合作来进一步提高企业的自我利益。当前,这一切都不是主流领导力和关于可持续性的公开论述的明智和可操作的一部分。本文提供的澄清可以导致许多领导人,尤其是政治领导人之间急需转变思维方式,其中许多领导人似乎陷入了简单的囚徒困境思考之中,并且采取了相应的行动。 (C)2016 Elsevier Ltd.保留所有权利。

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