首页> 外文期刊>Journal of the Chinese Institute of Industrial Engineers >Asymmetric Nash bargaining model for the eastern route of south-to-north water diversion supply chain cooperative operations 1 210046 210098 61801 * (* hmwang@hhu.edu.cn) View all notes 210098
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Asymmetric Nash bargaining model for the eastern route of south-to-north water diversion supply chain cooperative operations 1 210046 210098 61801 * (* hmwang@hhu.edu.cn) View all notes 210098

机译:南水北调东向供应链合作行动东部路线的非对称纳什讨价还价模型1 210046 210098 61801 *(* hmwang@hhu.edu.cn)查看所有注释210098

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摘要

The eastern route of south-to-north water diversion (SNWD) project is a large-scale multi-source, multi-objective and multi-project inter-basin system. Constructed to pump, store and supply water to achieve rational water distribution in North China, the project is close to completion currently, and faced with optimal operations management problems. Based on the project practice, this article develops a supply chain system for the SNWD project, where a Stackelberg game model under decentralized decisions, an asymmetric Nash bargaining model, and an asymmetric Nash bargaining model with risk of breakdown and discount are respectively built, and numerical analysis are carried out for managerial insights. This study suggests that: (i) asymmetric Nash bargaining provides a more efficient mechanism for south-to-north water diversion supply chain to achieve cooperative operations through non-cooperative way; (ii) the Agent's sharing profit earned is positively related to his bargaining power, and the optimal wholesale price and the sharing profit of the supplier increases as the bargaining power increases; (iii) due to the existence of the discount factor and the risk of breakdown, both sides in the bargaining game will make a concession to achieve a stationary solution for asymmetric Nash bargaining problem, which is beneficial for both sides of the SNWD supply chain; (iv) the optimal wholesale price increases as the probability of breakdown in disagreement increases; the supplier's optimal profit increases and the external distributor's optimal profit decreases as the probability of breakdown in disagreement increases. 1 2 3 4 View full textDownload full textKeywordsStackelberg game, asymmetric Nash bargaining model, south-to-north water diversion, cooperative operationsKeywords ;; ; Related var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10170669.2012.710878
机译:南水北调东线工程是一个大型的多源,多目标,多工程跨流域系统。该项目的建设是通过抽水,储水和供水来实现华北地区的合理配水,目前该项目已接近尾声,面临最佳运营管理问题。根据项目实践,本文为SNWD项目开发了一个供应链系统,其中建立了分散决策下的Stackelberg博弈模型,不对称的Nash讨价还价模型和不对称的Nash讨价还价模型,并且进行数值分析以获得管理见解。这项研究表明:(i)非对称纳什讨价还价为南水北调水供应链通过非合作方式实现合作运营提供了更有效的机制; (ii)代理人的分享利润与他的议价能力成正比,并且最佳批发价格和供应商的分享利润随着议价能力的增加而增加; (iii)由于存在折现因子和存在崩溃的风险,双方在讨价还价博弈中将做出让步,以实现针对非对称纳什讨价还价问题的固定解决方案,这对SNWD供应链的双方均有利; (iv)最佳批发价格随着分歧破裂的可能性的增加而增加;供应商的最优利润会增加,而外部分销商的最优利润会随着分歧破裂的可能性的增加而降低。 1 2 3 4查看全文下载全文关键词Stackelberg游戏,非对称纳什讨价还价模型,南水北调,合作行动;相关的var addthis_config = {ui_cobrand:“泰勒和弗朗西斯在线”,servicescompact:“ citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,更多”,pubid:“ ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b”};添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10170669.2012.710878

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