Does insider shareholding matter to corporate payout reactions to tax reforms?

摘要

Theory indicates that since Germany’s 2001 Tax Reform Act non-qualified shareholders have strongly preferred share repurchases over dividends, even though qualified or corporate shareholders are typically expected to be indifferent between the two. By contrast, prior to the reform most shareholders preferred dividends. As payout policies may be driven by taxes but also by factors arising from asymmetric information of agents and principals, this raises the question whether payout decisions are driven by ownership structure, i.e., members of the management board or other influential shareholders such as blockholders. Kaserer et al. (Z Betriebswirtschaft 82, 2012) investigate the impact of insider shareholding on payout policy. Their study sheds light on the mechanisms behind corporate payout policies and provides important new insights into the influence that insiders’ actions have on payout policies. The authors leave issues like the impact of voting power and of dominant shareholder groups more or less untreated, hence preparing the floor for a whole series of interesting future empirical studies.