Security‐constrained competitive mechanism research for thegeneration‐side electricity market based on economic mechanismdesign theory

摘要

Traditional electricity market mechanisms cannot effectively control strategicbehaviors of power generation companies, resulting in reduced market efficiency.Based on the economic mechanism design theory, a decentralized decision‐makingcompetitive mechanism applied in the generation‐side electricity market is developedto reduce the strategic behaviors of generation companies and align individualinterests with overall interests. At first, market clearing patterns and characteristicsfor the generation‐side electricity market are analyzed. Then, a study is conductedon the ideal economic mechanism design to identify 3 main elements of the mechanism,namely, information space, equilibrium information function, and resultfunction. Considering the physical constraints of the electricity system, includinggenerator output constraint and the active power flow constraints for transmissionlines, the ideal economic mechanism is refined. Finally, the effectiveness and practicabilityof the economic mechanism are verified through simulation on IEEE‐14system.