Is Agency a Power of Self-Movement?

摘要

Helen Steward argues that agency is a power to move oneself, and that it is specifically a power to move one's body. This conception of agency is supported by a long tradition and is widely held today. It is, however, opposed to another conception of agency on which agency is a power to transact with others-with other things and with other agents. The latter conception, though scarcely represented in contemporary action theory, is no less traditional than the one that Steward prefers. In this paper I argue, first, that Steward's official purposes do not require her to privilege self-movement over other-movement, as she resolutely does; and, second, that the two touchstones of truth to which she appeals throughout her book-namely ordinary thought and natural science-both recommend a conception of agency on which it is a power whose characteristic and definitive act is a transaction.