Consenting to Collective Action: The Classical Liberal Constitutional Calculus of James M. Buchanan

摘要

James M. Buchanan, a self-described classical liberal, had a research program extending more than half a century that was dedicated to analyzing-and justifying-collective action, including coercive action undertaken by governments. Buchanan's classical-liberal ideology rests firmly on a foundation of individualism, so it is interesting to analyze how his analysis moves from that individualistic foundation to a justification of collective action in which individuals are forced to comply with government edicts. The essence of Buchanan's framework is the idea that individuals can agree to be coerced and that the coercion they agree to furthers their own individual goals, including protecting them from having their rights violated by others. My analysis of Buchanan's constitutional calculus first looks at his individualistic foundation, then discusses the constitutional problem that Buchanan envisions, and, finally, analyzes critically some aspects of his constitutional calculus that may be at odds with his classical-liberal foundation.