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Physical Design Obfuscation of Hardware: A Comprehensive Investigation of Device and Logic-Level Techniques

机译:硬件的物理设计混淆:对设备和逻辑层技术的全面研究

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The threat of hardware reverse engineering is a growing concern for a large number of applications. A main defense strategy against reverse engineering is hardware obfuscation. In this paper, we investigate physical obfuscation techniques, which perform alterations of circuit elements that are difficult or impossible for an adversary to observe. The examples of such stealthy manipulations are changes in the doping concentrations or dielectric manipulations. An attacker will, thus, extract a netlist, which does not correspond to the logic function of the device-under-attack. This approach of camouflaging has garnered recent attention in the literature. In this paper, we expound on this promising direction to conduct a systematic end-to-end study of the VLSI design process to find multiple ways to obfuscate a circuit for hardware security. This paper makes three major contributions. First, we provide a categorization of the available physical obfuscation techniques as it pertains to various design stages. There is a large and multidimensional design space for introducing obfuscated elements and mechanisms, and the proposed taxonomy is helpful for a systematic treatment. Second, we provide a review of the methods that have been proposed or in use. Third, we present recent and new device and logic-level techniques for design obfuscation. For each technique considered, we discuss feasibility of the approach and assess likelihood of its detection. Then we turn our focus to open research questions, and conclude with suggestions for future research directions.
机译:硬件逆向工程的威胁日益受到众多应用程序的关注。防止逆向工程的主要防御策略是硬件混淆。在本文中,我们研究了物理混淆技术,这些技术会执行对手难以或无法观察到的电路元件更改。这种隐蔽操纵的例子是掺杂浓度或电介质操纵的变化。因此,攻击者将提取一个网表,该网表与被攻击设备的逻辑功能不符。这种伪装方法最近在文献中引起了关注。在本文中,我们阐述了这一有前途的方向,以便对VLSI设计过程进行系统的端到端研究,以发现多种混淆电路的方法,以提高硬件安全性。本文做出了三个主要贡献。首先,我们提供了与各个设计阶段有关的可用物理混淆技术的分类。存在用于引入混淆的元素和机制的大型多维设计空间,所提出的分类法有助于系统地处理。其次,我们对已经提出或正在使用的方法进行回顾。第三,我们介绍用于设计混淆的最新和新的设备和逻辑级别技术。对于所考虑的每种技术,我们都讨论了该方法的可行性并评估了其检测的可能性。然后,我们将重点转移到开放的研究问题上,并就未来的研究方向提出建议。

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