Double Auction Design for Short-Interval and Heterogeneous Spectrum Sharing

摘要

In emergent spectrum sharing markets, primary license holders (PLHs) may lease out underutilized spectrum to wireless service providers (WSPs) for access. This paper designs a single-round double auction for short-interval spectrum sharing, TDAMH, which considers spectrum heterogeneity in space, frequency and bandwidth, and achieves economic properties of individual rationality, budget balance, and truthfulness. By exploiting separations of frequency bands among PLHs and spatial demands among WSPs and VCG-based auction designs, two innovations of TDAMH are virtual bidding group (VBG) formation and problem decomposition to a few virtual blind auctions, one for each PLH as a seller and the PLH’s bidding VBGs as buyers. A VBG represents a group of spatially separated WSPs bidding on one PLH’s spectrum unit excluding the lowest bidding WSP. For auctioning each PLH’s units, TDAMH selects the highest VBG bids that are no less than the PLH’s reserve price as winners. By utilizing the excluded WSP’s bid to calculate VBG bid and obliging a winning VBG to pay as bid, TDAMH achieves desired economic properties. In test cases of up to 10 PLHs and 30 WSPs, TDAMH computation finishes in 5 seconds per case. TDAMH generates in average 28% higher revenue than reserve prices specified by PLHs.