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Three years ago, we flew from Shanghai on a trip to the Yellow Mountain, a little over 300 kms west of the city. The plane landed an hour or so later at a small airport in a fairly rural part of Anhui province in the area of Huangshan, a couple of hours drive from the mountainous landscape that we were visiting. We were met by a translator who could speak perfect English but had never been out of China and rarely out of the region itself. As we drove towards the granite peaks, the first village we encountered was dominated by grey forbidding-looking high-rise towers, some 30 stories in height, arranged in serried ranks along the highway. A year ago after my trip to Wuhan, I wrote in this journal about the property bubble in China (Batty, 2014), referring to the fact that after the Credit Crunch in 2007-2008, China reflated its economy through massive lending, which went largely to build infrastructure such as the kind of housing we encountered. I referred then to Robert Peston's (2014) incisive documentary on the scale of this investment and all the worry it might bring if the Chinese economy slows with demand for its products declining worldwide. Another credit crunch of the kind seen in the west nearly a decade ago but of a different genesis will then be upon us. With this debt now rising at 15% of GDP each year and with the proportion of such debt already more than 200% of GDP (Xie and Cao, 2015), the consequences for China and the world economy could be dire. Peston (2015) has more recently followed up his documentary with another article, where he recounts that slowing growth in China now looks as though it could spark such a bust as credit is squeezed and debts are called in. Interestingly, the Chinese government has chosen in fact to lower interest rates which would appear to be akin to keeping the boom alive, with all the predictions that the crash will be so much greater once it happens. Of course, the notion of a crash is extremely controversial with bankers and government alike arguing that China is the first country, perhaps the only country ever, to defy or to be able to defy the laws of financial gravity!
机译:三年前,我们从上海出发,去了距离城市以西300多公里的黄山。大约一个小时后,这架飞机降落在黄山地区安徽省农村地区的一个小型机场,距离我们所参观的山区风景只有几个小时的车程。我们遇到了一位会说流利的英语的翻译,但他从未离开过中国,很少离开该地区。当我们开车驶向花岗岩山峰时,我们遇到的第一个村庄是看起来像灰色的,令人禁忌的高层塔楼,这些塔楼高约30层,沿着高速公路排列成锯齿状。一年前,我去武汉旅行后,我在《华尔街日报》上写了一篇有关中国房地产泡沫的文章(Batty,2014年),指的是在2007-2008年信贷紧缩之后,中国通过大量贷款对经济进行了反思,主要用于建设基础设施,例如我们遇到的住房。然后,我提到罗伯特·佩斯顿(Robert Peston)(2014)的有关投资规模的敏锐纪录片,以及如果中国经济因其产品需求在全球范围内下降而放缓,可能带来的所有担忧。大约十年前在西方国家出现的另一种信贷紧缩,将源于我们。如今,这种债务每年以占GDP的15%的速度增长,而且这种债务的比例已经超过GDP的200%(Xie and Cao,2015),这对中国和世界经济的后果可能是可怕的。佩斯顿(2015)最近在他的纪录片之后又发表了另一篇文章,他在文章中指出,中国目前的增长放缓似乎在信贷紧缩和债务泛滥的情况下可能引发泡沫破灭。有趣的是,中国政府选择了实际上,降低利率似乎类似于保持繁荣的活力,所有预测都表明,一旦崩溃发生,崩溃将更加严重。当然,崩溃的概念在银行家和政府中引起了极大的争议,他们争辩说,中国是第一个或可能是唯一一个无视或能够无视财务重心法则的国家!

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