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Why fully liberalised electricity markets will fail to meet deep decarbonisation targets even with strong carbon pricing

机译:为什么即使碳价格坚挺,完全开放的电力市场也将无法实现深入的脱碳目标

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Full decarbonisation of the electricity system is one of the key elements to limit global warming. As this transition takes place, the electricity system must maintain system adequacy and remain affordable to consumers. In liberalised electricity markets investors are seen as key actors driving this transition.Due to the intermittent character of renewable assets, such as wind or solar parks, electricity systems with large shares of renewable electricity will need to become increasingly flexible. Evaluating whether specific market designs provide the right incentives to invest in flexibility, requires the simulation of realistic investor behaviour. Agent-based modelling provides the means to explore heterogeneous, imperfectly informed and boundedly rational investor behaviour within different electricity market designs.We evaluated two market designs; "energy-only" markets and markets with a Capacity Remuneration Mechanism (CRM). We conclude that energy-only markets, even with strong carbon pricing, do not incentivise investors to deliver a fully renewable, reliable and affordable energy system. Therefore policy makers should focus on developing CRMs which can work in combination with market incentives to reach a fully renewable, reliable and affordable electricity system in the second half of this century.
机译:电力系统的完全脱碳是限制全球变暖的关键因素之一。随着这种过渡的发生,电力系统必须保持系统的充分性,并保持消费者可承受的价格。在自由化的电力市场中,投资者被视为推动这一转变的主要参与者。由于风力或太阳能公园等可再生资产的间歇性特征,拥有大量可再生电力的电力系统将需要变得越来越灵活。要评估特定的市场设计是否能够提供适当的动机来进行灵活性投资,就需要模拟现实的投资者行为。基于主体的建模提供了探索不同电力市场设计中的异类,信息不完全和有限理性的投资者行为的手段。 “仅能源”市场和具有能力报酬机制(CRM)的市场。我们得出的结论是,即使能源价格高昂,纯能源市场也无法激励投资者提供完全可再生,可靠且负担得起的能源系统。因此,政策制定者应集中精力开发CRM,将其与市场激励措施结合使用,以在本世纪下半叶建立完全可再生,可靠且负担得起的电力系统。

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