Despite the prominence of information in theories of electoral accountability, providing voters with information often fails to improve politician performance. Using two experiments in the Philippines, we show that when voters are unfamiliar with basic government capabilities, merely informing them of what politicians could do is sufficient to decrease support for incumbents. However, politicians can counteract this decrease in support by increasing clientelistic practices such as vote buying. Our work shows how even neutral information campaigns can improve the leverage of voters vis-a-vis their politicians, offering guidance for the design of interventions to change the electoral equilibrium in clientelistic countries.
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机译：尽管采取选举责任理论的信息突出，但为选民提供信息，往往无法改善政治家绩效。 Using two experiments in the Philippines, we show that when voters are unfamiliar with basic government capabilities, merely informing them of what politicians could do is sufficient to decrease support for incumbents. 但是，政治家可以通过增加投票购买等客户型实践来抵消这一减少。 我们的工作表明，中立信息竞选活动甚至可以改善选民的杠杆作用，为其政治家提供指导，为改变客户均衡的选修期的设计。
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