Une histoire comparée de la philosophie des sciences, vol. I. Aux sources du Cercle de Vienne

摘要

it did not do so. Thomson extends this account to human actions; on her view, to say thatnthere is something we ought to do is to say that if someone knows what will probablynhappen if he does or does not do that thing, then he is defective if he does not do thatnthing. On Thomson’s account, then, directives apply to a thing only in virtue of itsnbelonging to a kind of which it is possible to be a defective member. Further, directivesnderive from evaluatives, just as on the consequentialist account. Where the consequentialistnbelieves we ought to increase the amount of goodness in the world or produce thenbest world, Thomson believes we must act so as to be a good human. Unlike consequentialists,nshe rejects the idea that there is a property of goodness relevant to moral evaluationnindependent of what makes us good members of our kind. Hence, she advocates ansort of ethical naturalism. Yet she also highlights her difference from virtue ethicists, innthat her account does not appeal to what a virtuous agent would do, but only to thenconcept of a non-defective human. Hence, on her view, her account does not requirensaintliness, as does virtue ethics.nThomson’s account draws out the lessons of Geach’s approach to goodness. Thomsonnis not alone in her effort, as her account strongly resembles Philippa Foot’s NaturalnGoodness , which also grounds claims about what one ought to do in human goodness.nLike Foot’s work, Thomson’s Normativity shows how much can yet be accomplished innmoral philosophy with the traditional tools of conceptual analysis.