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首页> 外文期刊>Frontiers in Psychology >The Detrimental Effects of No Trust: Active Decisions of No Trust Cause Stronger Affective and Behavioral Reactions Than Inactive Decisions
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The Detrimental Effects of No Trust: Active Decisions of No Trust Cause Stronger Affective and Behavioral Reactions Than Inactive Decisions

机译:没有信任的不利影响:无信任的积极决定导致比非活动决定更强的情感和行为反应

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In two experimental studies, we investigated the affective (Studies 1 and 2) and behavioral (Study 2) effects of not being trusted. In an adapted version of the Trust Game paradigm, participants were all assigned the position of Person B, and learned that their opponent (Person A) had decided to not let them divide monetary outcomes. This had either been an inactive decision (Person A had not offered them the option to distribute outcomes) or an active decision (Person A had taken away their option to distribute outcomes). Results of both studies reveal that reactions to not being trusted were significantly affected by whether this decision was active or inactive. Active decisions evoked a more negative evaluation toward Person A, led participants to experience more negative emotions, and lowered their satisfaction with the final outcome, even though payoffs and final earnings were held constant between the conditions (Study 1). In addition, when the decision not to trust had been an active decision, participants subsequently behaved less altruistic, as evidenced by significant lower allocations in a subsequent Dictator Game (Study 2). Interestingly, this reduction in altruism was not restricted to encounters with Person A, but also extended to an uninvolved other (Person C).
机译:在两项实验研究中,我们调查了情感(研究1和2)和行为(研究2)效应不受信任。在一个适应的信任游戏范式范围的版本中,参与者都分配了人类的立场,并了解到他们的对手(人A)决定不让他们划分货币结果。这是一个非活动决定(尚未向他们提供分配结果的人)或积极决定(人员已将其选项分配成果)。两项研究的结果表明,不受信任的反应受到该决定是否有效或不活跃的显着影响。积极决定对人的人,LED参与者唤起了更负面的评估,以体验更多的负面情绪,并降低了对最终结果的满足感,尽管在条件之间存在持续的收益和最终收益(研究1)。此外,当决定不信任一直是积极的决定时,参与者随后表现得不那么少的利他主义,如后续独裁者游戏中的显着较低分配所证明(研究2)。有趣的是,利他主义的这种减少不仅限于与人A的遇到,而且还扩展到未识别的其他(人C)。

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