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首页> 外文期刊>Frontiers in Psychology >Time Pressure and In-group Favoritism in a Minimal Group Paradigm
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Time Pressure and In-group Favoritism in a Minimal Group Paradigm

机译:在最小群体范式中的时间压力和群体偏袒

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Based on the group heuristic model and the model of intuitive cooperation, we hypothesized that in-group favoritism would be conspicuously shown through an intuitive process. To test this hypothesis, we utilized a minimal group paradigm, which is traditionally used in social psychological studies, and manipulated decision time in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game to compare the cooperative contribution level toward in-group and out-group members under three conditions: intuitive, empathic deliberation, and rational deliberation. Our findings confirmed that in-group favoritism was clearly shown in the intuitive condition only, suggesting that the intuitive cooperation model may only be valid in the context of social exchange with in-group members. Additional analysis also showed that in-group favoritism disappeared for participants who had been forced into empathic or rational deliberation for decision making. The theoretical implications of the findings are discussed.
机译:基于集团的启发式模型和直观合作模式,我们假设通过直观的过程明显地表调了集体偏袒。 为了测试这一假设,我们利用了一个最小的群体范式,传统上用于社会心理学研究,并在一枪囚犯的困境游戏中操纵决策时间,将合作贡献水平与三个小组和外汇组成员的合作贡献水平进行比较 条件:直观,移情审议和理性审议。 我们的调查结果证实,仅在直观的条件下清楚地表现出集体的偏袒,表明直观的合作模式可能只在与集团内成员的社会交换的背景下有效。 额外的分析还表明,对于被迫转入决策或合理审议的参与者,群体偏袒消失。 讨论了研究结果的理论意义。

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