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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Cross-Regional Coordinated Governance of Major Public Health Emergencies: The Example of the Spread of the COVID-19 Outbreak

机译:主要公共卫生突发事件跨区域协调治理的进化博弈分析:Covid-19爆发的传播示例

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Cross-regional governance of government often faces various problems, which often brings great loss to the society. The global outbreak of the novel coronavirus pneumonia (NCP) in early 2020 has not only caused serious economic and social losses to various countries but also put the current public health event governance system to a severe test. The cross-regional character and spillover effects of public health outbreak governance often make it difficult to coordinate cross-regional governance. In this context, this paper adopts a regional evolutionary game analysis framework and studies the cross-regional governance of public health emergencies by constructing a symmetric game of peripheral regions and an asymmetric game of core-peripheral regions. The marginal contribution of this paper is to attempt to construct a symmetric game model for peripheral regions and an asymmetric game model for core and peripheral regions using an evolutionary game approach to study the behavioral strategies of multiple regions in the governance of public health emergencies, and it is found that when the regional spillover effects and governance costs are small or the economic and social damages caused by public health emergencies are large, all regions will choose to conduct coordinated governance. Otherwise, there will be regions that choose to “free-ride.” This “free-rider” mentality has led to the failure in achieving good cross-regional collaborative governance of public health emergencies, resulting in a lack of efficiency in the overall governance of public health in society. However, when the spillover effect of regional governance exceeds a certain critical value, the result of the regional governance game is also the socially optimal result, when public health emergencies are effectively governed. At the same time, the relevant findings and analytical framework of this paper will provide a policy reference for the cross-regional governance of the current new crown epidemic.
机译:政府的跨区域治理经常面临各种问题,这通常会给社会带来巨大的损失。 2020年初新型冠状病毒肺炎(NCP)的全球爆发不仅为各国引起了严重的经济和社会损失,而且还将目前的公共卫生事件治理体系促成严峻考验。公共卫生爆发治理的跨区域性质和溢出效应常常使跨区域治理难以实现。在这方面,本文采用区域进化博弈分析框架,并通过构建外围区域对称游戏和核心周边地区的不对称游戏来研究公共卫生紧急情况的跨区域治理。本文的边际贡献是尝试使用进化游戏方法构建外围地区的对称游戏模型和用于核心和周边地区的非对称游戏模型,以研究公共卫生紧急情况治理的多个地区的行为策略结果发现,当区域溢出效应和治理成本小或由公共卫生紧急情况造成的经济和社会损害时,所有地区都将选择进行协调治理。否则,将有选择“自由乘坐”的地区。这种“自由骑手”心理导致了实现公共卫生紧急情况的良好跨区域协作治理的失败,导致社会公共卫生整体治理缺乏效率。然而,当区域治理的溢出效应超过某个临界价值时,区域治理游戏的结果也是社会最佳的结果,当公共卫生紧急情况有效治理时。与此同时,本文的相关调查结果和分析框架将为当前新皇冠流行病的跨区域治理提供政策参考。

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